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Introduction 
In two short essays (Dewey 1894, 1895), Dewey develops what we might call a “hybrid” model 
of emotions. Drawing on both Darwin and James, Dewey rejects the supposition—still common in 
emotion research today—that emotions are comprised of states or processes physically located within the 
individual subject, and specifically within the subject’s brain (see, for example, Damasio 1999; LeDoux 
1996; Nussbaum 2001; Panksepp 2004; Prinz 2004; Russell 2009; Schwarz and Clore 1988).  Instead, 
Dewey argues that emotions are made up of both internal (neural and physiological activity, phenomenal 
properties, cognitive judgments) and external processes (expressive behavior, ongoing “transactions” with 
the surrounding environment). All of these aspects are composite parts of emotions. Accordingly, to give 
one aspect explanatory priority at the expense of the others is to artificially sever a dynamically 
interrelated, distributed process spanning brain, expressive body, and world—what Dewey terms the 
“concrete whole” of emotional experience.     
I specifically consider Dewey’s rejection of the distinction between an emotion and its behavioral 
expression. I show that, for Dewey, the latter is a constituent part of the former; the expressive behavior is 
part of the ontology of some emotions. I argue that Dewey’s hybrid model not only receives support from 
current research in cognitive and neuroscience but, additionally, that it highlights the central role that 
agency and the social world play in the development and experiential character of our emotional life.  
 
Darwin, James, and the “functional coordination” between emotion and expression 
 Dewey’s hybrid model of emotions stems from the integration of what he thinks are the most 
valuable parts of theories of emotion developed by Darwin (1872) and James (1884, 1890). Dewey 
accepts Darwin’s evolutionary naturalism as a general principle. As he writes elsewhere, “[t]o see the 
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organism in nature, the brain in the nervous system, the cortex in the brain is the answer to the problems 
which haunt philosophy”.1 More specifically, Dewey appropriates Darwin’s naturalistic portrayal of 
emotions as reflected in bodily habits, or still-developing habits, oriented toward some practical end. For 
Dewey—following Darwin—emotions are aspects of ongoing patterns of action through which an 
organism successfully negotiates its biosocial world. This is their adaptive utility.2  
Dewey argues further that this agentive characterization of emotions, as we might term it, helps 
clarify their intentional character. Emotions involve an orientation or attitude toward some object or state 
of affairs: “[T]he full emotional experience…is always “about” or “toward” something; it is “at” or “on 
account of” something, and this prepositional reference is an integral phase of the single pulse of 
emotion”.3 Their teleological mooring is what distinguishes emotions from free-floating affect. For 
Dewey, emotions are thus both directed toward, and responsive to, features of the environment. 
Accordingly, highlighting the agentive and intentional character of emotions, Dewey insists, helps 
account both for the rationality of the behaviors associated with them as well as their capacity to further 
individual and communal life (i.e., their evolutionary significance) (Cunningham 1995, 866). As Dewey 
puts it—again following Darwin—emotional behaviors have been selected in virtue of their usefulness 
not merely for expressing felt experiences but rather for their utility “qua acts—as serving life”, that is, as 
acts that have proven useful in the larger struggle for survival.4 Emotions are in this way part and parcel 
of our situated agency.     
Despite this positive appropriation, Dewey nevertheless rejects parts of Darwin’s theory. 
Specifically, Dewey rejects Darwin’s serial characterization of “the relation of emotion to organic 
peripheral action [i.e., expression], in that it assumes the former as prior and the latter as secondary”.5 
According to Darwin, the emotion itself—its affective core, its felt aspect—exists antecedently to and 
independently from its behavioral expression. While bodily habits and specific behaviors reflect 
emotions, they are not, strictly speaking, parts of the emotions they reflect. Accordingly, emotions are 
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functionally discrete processes; they are distinct from both stimulus (a charging bear) and response 
(facially expressing fear; judgment that the bear is fearful, etc.) (cf. Garrison 2003, 406).6  
Dewey rejects this assumption. He argues that such an atomistic and, in particular, internalist 
conception of emotions is problematic for several reasons (Cunningham 1995). First, it generates an 
artificially simplified, serial account of a phenomenon that, in its lived fullness, rather exhibits an 
integrated, dynamic, and multidimensional reality.7 I say more about this below.  
Second, this reductive distortion mischaracterizes the causal relations linking stimulus, mental 
state, and response. Dewy observes that, in order for a stimulus (a charging bear) to be judged as fearful, 
say, the stimulus must already be colored with an affective quality; it must already be perceived as 
fearful.8 On its own, the cold cognitive judgment that a particular stimulus is fearful is not sufficient to 
trigger the resultant cascade of emotion-related responses (physiological, behavioral, and expressive 
reactions associated with fear). In other words, if the perceptual stimulus is to be part of the emotion, it 
must be given with an affective valence in order to explain how it is that we respond to it the way that we 
do.             
It is here that Dewey turns to James, looking to establish an “organic connection”, as he puts it, 
between Darwin’s evolutionary naturalism and James’ somatic theory of emotion—and in particular, 
James’ dual-emphasis on the neurophysiological and action-oriented dimensions of emotions.9 Dewey is 
particularly drawn to James because James rejects the thesis that an emotion is causally prior to and thus 
distinct from its expression.10 Instead, he famously argues that emotional experience arises within, and is 
in fact constituted by, the associated neurophysiological responses and expressive action.   
James writes: 
Our natural way of thinking about these coarser emotions is that the mental perception of some 
fact excites the mental affection called the emotion, and that this latter state of mind gives rise to 
the bodily expression. My theory, on the contrary, is that the bodily changes follow directly the 
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perception of the exciting fact and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the 
emotion. Common-sense says…we meet bear, are frightened and run…The hypothesis here to be 
defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect, that the one mental state is not immediately 
induced by the other, that the bodily manifestations must first be interposed between, and that the 
more rational statement is that we first feel sorry because we cry, angry because we 
strike…Without the bodily states following on the perception, the latter would be purely 
cognitive in form, pale, colorless, destitute of emotional warmth. We might then see the bear, and 
judge it best to run…but we should not actually feel afraid or angry.11 
For James, then, the perception of, say, a fearful stimulus (a bear) first triggers various instinctive 
neurophysiological responses. These responses—and the actions they feed into—form the basis of both 
our judgments (running away, we get the idea of “bear-as-thing-to-be-run-away-from”) as well as our 
emotional phenomenology.12 As Dewey glosses James, our “beating heart, trembling and running legs, 
sinking in stomach, looseness of bowels, etc.” are part of “a certain act of seeing, which by habit, whether 
inherited or acquired, sets up other acts” such as turning and running away or judging that the bear is 
fearful.13 The important point is that, from the start, perception and action are coupled processes. The 
process of my seeing the bear as fearful—and experiencing the bear I see as fearful, or judging it to be 
so—is “constituted via the organic co-ordination of certain sensorimotor (or ideo-motor) activities, on the 
one side, and of certain vegetative-motor activities on the other”.14 In other words, our agency 
underwrites both our emotional experience and associated evaluative judgments.   
Dewey does not accept James’ view wholeheartedly, however.  In particular, he accuses James of 
failing to offer a more comprehensive account of how “to connect the emotional seizure [the experience] 
with the other phases of the concrete emotion-experience”.15 For Dewey, instinctive responses are only a 
part of emotional functioning; other phases that must be accounted for include higher cognitive 
functioning, communication, and interpretation (Garrison 2003, 409). Nevertheless, Dewey notes that 
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James was mainly concerned with the phenomenology of emotional experience and likely did not intend 
his theory to be taken as “dealing with emotion as a concrete whole”.16     
 In sum, Dewey accepts Darwinian naturalism and, in particular, Darwin’s association of emotions 
with adaptively useful actions. This characterization emphasizes both their agentive character and social 
function. But Dewey rejects Darwin’s implicit assumption that an emotion is distinct from the behavior 
expressing it. This is where Dewey turns to James, who rather argues that behavioral expressions are a 
constitutive part of the emotion itself. Experience and expression are “functionally coordinated” within 
the larger dynamic of the emotion considered as a concrete whole.         
 
The character of expression 
For Dewey, then, an emotion is partially constituted by its bodily expression. Before considering 
empirical evidence that appears to support this idea, I first consider how we might understand 
“expression” in this context. I also situate Dewey next to some similar ideas developed within the 
phenomenological tradition.  
Peter Goldie argues that an expression of emotion is only genuine if it isn’t performed as a means 
to some further end (Goldie 2000a, 2000b). There are three ways that an expression of emotion can fail to 
satisfy this condition. First, it can be done insincerely—such as when I smile and feign happiness upon 
shaking hands with someone I strongly dislike. In this situation, there is no authentic emotion motivating 
the expression. Rather, it is performed mechanically out of respect for the social norms governing that 
encounter. Second, an expression can be genuine (a frown expressing anger) but performed calculatingly, 
that is, to intentionally convey to others that one is experiencing this emotion—a communicative intention 
which becomes the true end of the expressive act. This calculative performance removes the spontaneity 
at the heart of authentic emotional expression and transforms the expression from an end to a means. 
Third, an expression cannot be done simply for pleasure: for example, kicking a table leg out of anger to 
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feel better. Again, this would transform the expressive act from an end to a means—namely, the goal of 
slightly alleviating one’s anger. So, for Goldie a genuine expression of emotion must be sincere, 
spontaneous, and self-contained (i.e., an end in itself). 
Even with these conditions in place, the class of actions which are authentic expressions of 
emotion is fairly broad. It includes things like facial expressions, gestures, whole-body movements, 
spontaneous touches, gaze or breathing patterns, and prosody. Characterized thusly, genuine expressions 
of emotion seem to inhabit a middle space between mere bodily changes (responses of the autonomic 
nervous system, hormonal changes, muscular reactions, etc.) and reasoned actions that flow from 
emotions (actions made rationally intelligible by appealing to some combination of beliefs and desires) 
(Goldie 2000b). They have an experiential significance that renders them more meaningful than the 
former; yet they don’t lend themselves to belief-desire rationalization quite like the latter.17 However, as 
we will see—and as Dewey emphasizes—they seem to be a constitutive aspect of emotional experience 
and thus require explicit consideration. 
A number of phenomenologists make a similar claim (see Krueger and Overgaard 2012). 
Consider the following well-known remark by Max Scheler:  
[W]e certainly believe ourselves to be directly acquainted with another person’s joy in his 
laughter, with his sorrow and pain in his tears, within his shame in his blushing, with his entreaty 
in his outstretched hands, with his love in his look of affection, with his rage in his gnashing of 
his teeth, with his threats in the clenching of his fist, and with the tenor of this thoughts in the 
sound of his words. If anyone tells me that this is not ‘perception’ [of the emotion itself], for it 
cannot be so, in view of the fact that a perception is simply a ‘complex of physical sensations’, 
and that there is certainly on sensation of another person’s mind nor any stimulus from such a 




According to Scheler, we see the mental states of others within the dynamics of their expressive behavior. 
This is significant because it means that there is no need to posit an additional extra-perceptual cognitive 
mechanism (analogical inference, etc.) purportedly responsible for our detection of others’ mentality. 
Rather, since mental states are observable, they can be directly perceived. This sort of direct, non-
inferential social perception, Scheler argues, is sufficient for accessing others minds directly and securing 
our knowledge of them (Gallagher 2008; Krueger 2012). 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty defends a similar view. Although he doesn’t say much about emotions 
explicitly—his discussions of emotions are generally part of his larger treatments of aesthetics, infant 
cognition, intersubjectivity, and bodily expressivity (Cataldi 2008)—his dogged advocacy of a thoroughly 
embodied approach to cognition makes him highly relevant. Like Scheler, Merleau-Ponty insists that 
mental phenomena are often directly visible in another’s expressive behavior and manner of bodily 
comportment. He writes that 
We must abandon the fundamental prejudice according to which the psyche is that which is 
accessible only to myself and cannot be seen from the outside. My “psyche” is not a series of 
“states of consciousness” that are rigorously closed in on themselves and inaccessible to anyone 
but me. My consciousness is turned primarily toward the world, turned toward things; it is above 
all a relation to the world.  The other’s consciousness as well is chiefly a certain way of 
comporting himself toward the world. Thus it is in his conduct, in the manner in which the other 
deals with the world, that I will be able to discover his consciousness.19 
But not only is our body “our general medium for having a world”, according to Merleau-Ponty; 
additionally, “the body is essentially an expressive space”.20 He writes elsewhere that 
I do not see anger or a threatening attitude as a psychic fact hidden behind the gesture, I read 
anger in it. The gesture does not make me think of anger, it is anger itself.21 
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I perceive the grief or anger of the other in his conduct, in the face or his hands, without recourse 
to any ‘inner’ experience of suffering or anger, and because grief and anger are variations of 
belonging to the world, undivided between the body and consciousness, and equally applicable to 
the other’s conduct, visible in his phenomenal body, as in my own conduct as it is presented to 
me.22 
By insisting that anger, for example, isn’t a psychic fact hidden behind the gesture but that it is, rather, the 
gesture itself—and that emotions such as anger and grief are thus “undivided between the body and 
consciousness”—Merleau-Ponty rejects the idea of a split between an inner emotion and its outer 
expression. Like Dewey and Scheler, Merleau-Ponty denies that emotion and expression are merely 
causally related (in the sense that the former is causally antecedent to the latter) but instead insists that 
their relation is one of constitution.23 Seeing another’s angry gesture is therefore to see an outward-facing 
feature of their anger itself.  
To return to Dewey: one argument Dewey gives in support of this idea is that, from the standpoint 
of the subject undergoing the emotion, there is, strictly speaking, no such thing as an expression of 
emotion. Rather, there is simply the emotion as lived through—part of which includes an “expressive” 
component: the emotional experience as articulated through a particular piece of overt behavior or pattern 
of “serviceable associated habits.24 But Dewey argues further that “[t]o rate such movements as primarily 
expressive is to fall into the psychologist’s fallacy: it is to confuse the standpoint of the observer and 
explainer with that of the fact observed”.25 From the first-person perspective we simply live through our 
emotions. We only speak of an emotion’s “expression” when “looking at it from the standpoint of an 
observer—whether a spectator or the person himself as scientifically reflecting upon his movements, or 
aesthetically enjoying them”.26 But this distinction between an emotion and its expression—insofar as it is 
taken to refer to a basic fact about the ontology of emotions—conflates the 1st and 3rd person perspective. 
It “names the facts not as they are, but in their second intention” (i.e., from an external vantage point).27 
This is because an emotion and its expression are originally “one organic pulse…whose reality is the 
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whole concrete co-ordination of eye-leg-heart, etc….within this one whole of action”.28 Again, emotions 
for Dewey are temporally-extended modes of behavior constituted by the functional coordination of inner 
and outer components. This is their concrete reality.          
With this phenomenological argument against the emotion/expression distinction, Dewey is thus 
in good philosophical company. As we will see later on, Dewey’s analysis also adds an important social 
dimension to emotional experience that doesn’t appear to be explicitly present in phenomenological 
treatments of emotions. However, I now discuss some work in cognitive and neuroscience that appears to 
provide empirical support for Dewey’s hybrid model of emotions.    
 
Empirical support 
Emotions without a face 
The first line of evidence I want to consider involves Moebius Syndrome (MS). MS is a rare form 
of congenital facial paralysis. It is normally complete and bilateral, and results from maldevelopment of 
the sixth and seventh cranial nerves (Briegel 2006). People with MS lack facial animation; they also lack 
ocular abduction and tend to move their entire head when tracking objects in the environment.29 People 
with MS thus lack access to basic physical resources that most of us take for granted when expressing 
emotion: the ability to facially articulate the emotion and in so doing provide face-related social cues to 
others. 
This lack of facial animation affects how people with MS experience emotions. They often report 
feeling that, generally speaking, their emotional life is somehow less robust than it ought to be; they also 
report that the phenomenology of particular emotions is diminished. This diminishment is felt to be 
connected with a lack of facial expressiveness.  
 Consider the following quotes. One individual with MS, James, puts the point this way: 
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I have a notion which has stayed with me over much of my life—that it is possible to live in your 
head, entirely in your head. I think I get trapped in my mind or my head. I sort of think happy or I 
think sad, not really saying or recognizing actually feeling happy or feeling sad…maybe I have to 
intellectualize mood…I’m thinking rather than feeling it.30 
James’ narrative suggests that he has adopted a kind of mentalizing stance with respect to his emotion; it 
becomes a process he reflectively thinks through, rather than something he experiences. Accordingly, the 
qualitative component of his emotional experience, if not missing entirely, is diminished. Even the 
process of falling in love with his wife becomes, at least at the beginning, a predominantly cognitive 
enterprise: “I was probably thinking [of being in love] initially. It was some years later when I really felt 
in love”.31 This feeling of disconnectedness from his emotions—which carries over into a more pervasive 
feeling of disconnectedness from others—leads James to summarize his relationship to his own emotions 
this way: “I’ve often thought of myself as a spectator rather than a participant”.32 
 Other individuals with MS report similarly diminished emotional experience. Speaking of her 
childhood, one woman reports that, “I did not express emotion. I am not sure that I felt emotion, as a 
defined concept”.33 Another woman describes the experience of playing the piano:  
By 13 I was quite competent and I found that my fingers unleashed emotion and expression in 
me, even though I did not know what they were. I would play one piece again and again in 
various ways; happy, sad, cheeky, all jumbled up inside…I might have been in one mood but 
another would come out through my fingers, there were channels of all sorts of different things 
inside me”.34        
This mode of expression allowed her to discover a novel way to articulate—and thus experience—
previously inaccessible emotional experiences. 
The idea of recruiting compensatory strategies to overcome a lack of facial animation—and, in so 
doing, recalibrate the phenomenology of emotional experience—appears in other MS narratives. For 
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example, another woman reports that she learned to experience certain emotions only after traveling to 
Spain and, after careful scrutiny, teaching herself to mimic the gestures she encountered there. She writes: 
I do not think I had emotion when I was a child but now I have it. How did I get it? From Spain. I 
learnt Spanish in two months but—more—they are very graphic in their emotional expression. 
The body language I had learnt and used at university could be exaggerated in Spain, using the 
whole body to express one’s feelings…because of this I learnt to feel within me…because of the 
cultural up regulation of feeling in gesture I learnt to feel. I am not sure how I mapped gesture 
and feeling onto my body, but I was starting to feel then. I could feel really ecstatic, happy, for 
the first time ever.35    
Others with MS tell similar stories. Many adopt alternative compensatory strategies of embodied 
expression—prosody, gestures, and verbalization, along with energetic artistic activities such as painting, 
dancing, and (as we’ve seen) playing the piano—to scaffold their emotional experience and support its 
emergence in a new and more intense format (Bogart and Matsumoto 2010; cf. Krueger 2013a, Krueger 
and Michael 2012).  
 At this point, one might object that people with MS lack a reliable criterion for assessing their 
purported emotional diminishment (or, for that matter, its subsequent recalibration). In other words, since 
MS is congenital, how can they know if their emotional experience is genuinely diminished? They simply 
aren’t in a position to provide a reliable assessment when it comes to this part of their psychological 
economy. However, there are other sources of evidence that appear to support MS narratives. 
 Consider the case of Oliver, an individual who developed Bell’s Palsy—a form of facial paralysis 
affecting the seventh cranial nerve—while at university (Cole 1999). Oliver is instructive because he 
systematically developed facial immobility whilst at university, lived with it for a period of six months, 
and then recovered. Like those with MS, Oliver experienced bilateral paralysis; over a period of several 
weeks, he lost the ability to move either side of his face except for some slight movement around the eyes 
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and eyebrows. What is particularly illuminating about this case is that, because his condition was 
progressive and not congenital, Oliver was in a unique position to track the diminishment of his emotional 
life commensurate with his gradual loss of facial animation. He describes settling into a kind of emotional 
limbo with his loss of facial expressivity:  
I suppose I didn’t feel constantly happy, but then I didn’t feel constantly sad…I felt almost as if 
in a limbo between feelings---just non-emotional…it was within myself, an emotion limbo. I still 
felt happy to see or hear something I liked, but I didn’t think that I felt it as much because I was 
not actually smiling. I started to write a diary…writing helped a lot. Such and such has happened 
and I feel this. Writing allowed me to express.36  
For Oliver, it thus appears that the physical act of writing is another kind of compensatory strategy—a 
“surrogate scaffolding”, as we might put it, functioning in place of an animated face—enabling Oliver to 
externally express his emotions and recalibrate at least part of their diminished phenomenology. 
Moreover, his experience seems to lend further support to the idea that the facial expression of emotion is 
in fact part of the emotion itself, a kind of external material scaffolding that plays a central role in 
supporting its emergence.    
 
Further evidence 
 In considering the idea the idea of a reciprocal link between emotional expression and experience, 
we need not confine ourselves to MS narratives or other forms of facial paralysis. A wealth of other 
studies indicates that the manipulation of expressive behavior produces a corresponding change in 
emotional phenomenology. 
The largest and most consistent body of evidence concerns facial expressions. For example, 
multiple studies have found that when subjects are induced to adopt a particular posture or emotion-
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specific facial expression (grimacing, frowning, etc.), they report experiencing the corresponding emotion 
(disgust, anger, etc.) (Duclos and Laird 2001; Duclos et al. 1989; Edelman 1984; Flack et al. 1999; 
Kellerman and Laird 1982; for reviews, see Laird 2007; Niedenthal 2007; Niedenthal and Maringer 
2009). Paula Niedenthal has surveyed extensive research indicating both that (1) that adopting emotion-
specific facial expressions and postures influences preferences and attitudes (for example, subjects judge 
comic strips funnier when smiling, less funny when frowning, etc.), and (2) inhibition of bodily 
expression leads to diminished emotional experience, as well as interference in processing emotional 
information (Niedenthal 2007; Niedenthal et al. 2005). With respect to (1), unconsciously mimicking a 
conversation partner’s facial expressions appears to generate a similar experience as well as a mutual 
feeling of empathy and rapport (Chartrand and Bargh 1999). However, with respect to (2), deficits in 
spontaneous facial mimicry—in autism (Hermans et al 2009) or some instances of severe depression or 
melancholia (Fuchs 2005)—can lead to diminished affect more generally, as well as an impaired ability to 
process emotional expressions in others (see also Clark et al 2008; McIntosh et al 2006).  
A related strand of research has investigated the experiential effects of exaggerating or 
minimizing emotional expressions. In one study, subjects were asked to endure a series of painful electric 
shocks (Lanzetta et al 1976). During some of the trials, subjects were asked to exaggerate their expressive 
reactions to the shocks; during other trials, they were asked to inhibit them. Skin conductance was 
measured during these different trials. In the exaggeration condition, skin conductance was higher and 
subjects reported more intense feelings of pain. In the inhibition condition, skin conductance and pain 
reports were diminished. Other studies of a similar form replicated these results (Gross 1999; Kleck et al 
1976; Kraut 1982; Zuckerman et al 1981). These findings suggest that exaggerating emotional 
expressions intensifies emotional phenomenology whereas inhibiting expressive behavior diminishes it.    
The idea of a reciprocal link between facial expression and the experience of emotion receives 
further powerful support from studies of individuals who receive Botox injections, which inhibits facial 
expressiveness (i.e., a kind of voluntary MS). Individuals who receive Botox injections report a decrease 
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in the intensity of emotional experience (Davis et al. 2010) and are slower in processing emotional 
language referring to expressions (such as anger and frowning) requiring the paralyzed muscle (Havas et 
al. 2010). Hennenlotter et al. (2009) found that patients who receive Botox injections in frowning muscles 
show reduced activity in the amygdala and brainstem during the imitation of angry facial expressions. As 
a result, both the sensory input and visceromotor output controlled by these structures is inhibited, leading 
to a diminished emotional experience (Caruana and Gallese 2012). 
But it is likely that emotional experience isn’t just tied to facial expressivity. The “sensorimotor 
activities”37 that Dewey argues are constitutive of certain emotional experiences extend beyond an 
emotion’s facial signature into gestures, movement, and more general modes of bodily comportment. 
Additional evidence seems to support the idea that emotional experiences harbor a motor component. For 
example, individuals who have suffered severe spinal cord injuries report less intense feelings of high-
arousal emotions such as fear, anger, or sexual arousal (Chwalisz et al. 1988; Hohmann 1966; see also 
Laird 2007, 74–76; Mack et al. 2005). A similar effect can be found in cases that don’t involve paralysis. 
A number of other studies have manipulated postures and observed changes in feeling of depression, 
anger, fear, sadness, confidence and pride (see Berkowitz 1994; Duclos and Laird 2001; Duclos et al 
1989; Flack et al 1999; Riskind 1984; Riskind and Gotay 1982; Stepper and Strack 1993).  
Finally, Caruana et al (2011) found that intracortical microstimulation (ICMS) of two different 
sectors of the macaque insula—a part of the brain involved in the representation of bodily sensations, as 
well as emotion and emotion recognition—resulted in distinct emotion-specific behaviors (disgust and 
affiliative states) and autonomic responses.  ICMS of the anterior sector of the insula evoked disgust-
related behavior comprised of both a specific motor component (grimace) and more complex context-
dependent behavior (refusal of food). ICMS applied to a posterior sector evoked affiliative behavior (lip-
smacking). This functional data suggests the insula plays an important role in determining both the 
external and internal aspects of a given emotion (i.e., both experience and behavior). The more general 
point is that emotional experience is shaped even at the neural level by a motor component.     
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In sum, the wide-ranging evidence surveyed above provides compelling support for Dewey’s 
hybrid model of emotions. While the empirical details of the precise relation between emotion and 
expression have yet to be clarified, it does seem that the expression of an emotion is sufficient to bring 
about its experience. There exists, to return to Dewey’s expression, a functional coordination between 
internal (neurophysiological and phenomenological) and external (expressive and behavioral) parts of the 
concrete whole of emotion. The outward-facing visible expression of emotion is thus part of the emotion 
itself. Publically perceivable behavior doesn’t merely carry information about “private” emotions (i.e., my 
facial expression conveys the anger I feel inside). Rather, the latter is, at least at times, a proper part of the 
former; to see the expression is to see part of the emotional mind in action. 
 
Beyond expression: emotions, agency, and the social niche 
 There is a further implication of Dewey’s hybrid model worth discussing. It stems from the 
Dewey’s more general contention that agency is a core feature of emotional experience. Emotions aren’t 
things that simply happen to us. They are often things that we do. We enact emotions (Colombetti and 
Thompson 2008). And as Dewey reminds us with his criticism of James—a criticism that might also 
apply to some phenomenologists—there is generally more to an emotion than an involuntary 
neurophysiological or even a gestural response. Since agency is always situated—that is, embedded in 
encompassing physical and social contexts—other people play a material role in helping us to enact our 
shared emotional experiences. However, by focusing exclusively on the neurophysiological and/or 
gestural aspects of emotional experience, there is a danger of overlooking the extent to which emotions 
are socially mediated over both short and long-term time scales. But by following Dewey’s lead and 
stressing the agentive and socially-situated character of emotional performance, we can get a clearer 
picture of how social and emotional processes intertwine dynamically in real time. 
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 Dewey emphasizes this point by first pointing out the dialogical character of infant emotions. 
From the start of life, others are intimately involved in the development and negotiation of our emotional 
experiences. Infants use laughter and positive emotions, for example, as affiliative and communicative 
displays intended to prompt further interaction. Dewey observes that, within free play episodes, 
“[r]hythmical activities, as peek-a-boo, call out a laugh at every culmination of the transition, in an infant. 
A child of from one and a half to two years uses the laugh as a sign of assent; it is his emphatic “I do” or 
“yes” to any suggested idea to which he agrees or which suddenly meets his expectations”.38 But the 
caregiver’s physical interventions (gestures, facial expressions, direction of gaze, body orientation, 
patterns of touch and vocalization, etc.) play a critical role in mediating this process (cf. Krueger 2013b). 
Both agents thus co-regulate this exchange. The experience and expression of happiness arises within this 
shared dynamic; the emotion has both a social origin and function. Much evidence from developmental 
psychology supports Dewey’s observation (see Reddy 2008, Stern 1999, and Trevarthen 1993).        
This dialogical process doesn’t end in childhood. As Dewey observes, emotions remain socially 
mediated throughout our lives.39 Consider the following scenario: I am angry. I suspect that my wife has 
been unfaithful. As I brood, my imagination swells with images of how I suspect this betrayal has 
unfolded. Each new image intensifies my anger. But things aren’t quite that simple. For anger is rarely a 
free-standing state. Along with my anger, I actually experience an interrelated constellation of various 
other emotions: jealousy in the face of her betrayal; shame at my naïve trust; humiliation at the thought of 
others finding out; sadness at the dissolution of a long-term commitment; disgust at the thought of her 
being physically intimate with another, etc. Within the throes of this episode, any of these emotions may 
at any moment take precedence over the others without thereby cancelling out their phenomenal presence. 
The particular phenomenology of my anger in this context is thus conditioned by the simultaneous 
upwelling of a flurry of other emotions. Later, however, after some reflection and cooling off, a weary 
sadness may assume phenomenological prominence without completely effacing the anger that had 
previously burned so intensely. And when discussing the situation even later with friends, my shame and 
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humiliation may come to the fore, preserving the anger but modifying its felt texture by diminishing its 
intensity and introducing a more prominent shame-dimension.        
 An important lesson here is that emotions are often structurally complex both in terms of their 
ontology (i.e., they are hybrid, as we’ve previous discussed, composed of features both internal and 
external to the skin) as well as their phenomenology. It is therefore misleading to speak of “anger or 
“sadness” as though these terms pick out neatly circumscribed experiential states. The phenomenology of 
our emotional life is much messier than this way of speaking would suggest. This is because emotions are 
very often long-term processes “lasting even for years or a lifetime and occupying several levels or 
dimensions of consciousness”.40 Moreover, as the above example affirms—and as Dewey also 
observes41—emotions evolve as we negotiate various social contexts. They are interactively constituted in 
the sense that they are deeply interwoven with those of other people, along with the material and 
ideological structures of our social niche (Downing 2000; Parkinson et al 2005).  
These observations further affirm Dewey’s emphasis on the dynamic and transactional character 
of emotional experience—the idea, once more, that emotions are both structurally complex (i.e., 
interwoven with other emotions, and comprised of different dimensions like physiological arousal, 
cognitive judgments, intentionality, felt affect, etc.) as well as essentially temporal (i.e., they evolve and 
develop over time).42 When sharing my anger over my wife’s infidelity with friends, my anger solicits an 
angry response from them, which heightens my own anger, which in turn further animates theirs, etc. 
Many emotions thus emerge quite literally between interactants, within this ongoing mutual adjustment of 
action, emotion, expression, and intention (Fogel and Garvey 2007).  
Moreover, as interactively constituted, emotions are forms of engagement or “variations of 
belonging to the world”.43 They are part of our social agency. We use emotions to construct, modify and 
negotiate various aspects of our relationships with other people and with the surrounding context (Hinde 
1985; Maclaren 2011). This is their social function, their adaptive utility. Emotional expressions are 
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therefore more than simply the external aspect of an intensely felt feeling or physiological reaction; 
rather, they motivate interaction and sustain our ongoing relationships with others. They enable us to 
negotiate our social niche (Krueger forthcoming). 
As with Dewey’s contention that an expression is part of the emotion, there is empirical support 
for this view. Consider audience effects. Ten-pin bowling players, for example, smile significantly more 
after producing a positive event (such as bowling a strike or spare) when they turn to face their friends 
than when they are still facing the pins (Kraut and Johnston 1979). The physical presence of others 
provides a social niche in which a smile articulates a strong social motivation: an intention to share one’s 
happiness and to relish the further development of this experience as mediated by the affiliative displays 
of others. A similar effect was observed in Spanish soccer fans who issue authentic (“Duchenne”) smiles 
in response to goals only when facing one another (Fernández-Dols and Ruiz-Belda 1997). Even Olympic 
athletes, whom one would presume could barely contain their joy at reaching the pinnacle of their field, 
smile during medal ceremonies almost exclusively when actually receiving their gold medal—that is, 
when interacting with officials and the public—as opposed to non-interactive contexts such as before the 
ceremony (by themselves in the tunnel, away from TV cameras) or while facing their country’s flag 
during the playing of the National Anthem (Fernández-Dols and Ruiz-Belda 1995).   
Studies of audience effects on emotional experience are in this way one line of research 
suggesting that facial displays and other bodily expressions of emotion are mediated by the extent to 
which individuals can fully interact in social situations (Chovil 1991).44 It often takes the presence of 
others—as well as the appropriate context—to draw an emotion out of us and help us complete it. Of 
course, the emotion may be initially comprised of an instinctive physiological response and behavioral 
expression, which gives way to subsequent appraisals, judgments, and further associated behavior. These, 
too, are constituents of some emotional experiences. But the central point is that, very often, we sustain 
this initial impulse by following through with the emotion’s affective and evaluative trajectory. We exert 
our agency and enact the experience by falling to our knees and bodily giving ourselves over to our 
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sobbing, unleashing our rage in an extravagant display of clenched fists and contorted facial expressions, 
or willfully subduing our rising joy by taking a deep breath and adopting a relaxed posture. And crucially, 
we do this with others, within varying social contexts. Again, our emotional agency is always situated. 
Others thus enter into and play a central role in shaping the affective, evaluative, and agentive trajectory 
of our emotional performances. The external processes within Dewey’s hybrid model of emotions are 
therefore not merely circumscribed by the gestures and movements of individual agents. Beyond this, the 
people and structures of our social niches are likewise part of the external processes responsible for the 
emergence of many of our emotional experiences. They, too, are part of our hybrid emotional mind.              
To conclude, I have tried to sketch out Dewey’s hybrid model of emotion and show not only that 
it receives robust support from current research in cognitive and neuroscience but, additionally, that it 
highlights the central role that agency and the social world play in the development and character of our 
emotional life. This is not to deny, of course, that emotions are partially composed of intraindividual or 
nonsocial components or processes. Nor am I suggesting that an individual-centered approach to emotion 
research is never appropriate. Nevertheless, Dewey’s hybrid model reminds us that emotions are dynamic, 
structurally complex and multi-dimensional. Ultimately, then, for a clearer picture of the “concrete 
whole” of our emotional life, we must resist an excessively brain-centered prejudice and be mindful of the 
larger embodied, social, and interactive contexts within which we are always situated and from which our 
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